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LAW NOTES
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S
CASE TO TRUSTS
The Rule in Shelley's Case, non-technically expressed, is that
rule which enlarges a life estate into a fee when the life estate
is followed by a remainder to the heirs of the life tenant.
The remainder to the life tenant's "heirs" is construed to be
words of limitation and not words of purchase.
One technical statement of the rule, often adopted by courts,
is that when a person takes an estate of freehold legally or
equitably, under a deed, will, or other writing, and in the same
instrument there is a limitation by way of remainder, either
with or without the interposition of another estate, of an in-
terest of the same legal or equitable character, to his heirs
or heirs of his body, as a class of persons to take in succession
from generation to generation, the limitation entitles the an-
cestor to the whole estate.1
Herein will be considered the effect and impact of the in-
terposition of a trust situation on the application of the rule.
A prerequisite for the application of the rule is that the
estate in the ancestor and that in the heirs must be of the same
quality before they can coalesce; i.e., they must both be
equitable or both legal.2 Accordingly, when the estates are of
different qualities - the one legal, the other equitable - such
as a legal life estate and an equitable remainder, the Rule in
Shelley's Case has no application.3 A trust situation often
1. Green v. Green, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 75, 23 L.Ed. 75 (1874), quoting
1 PRESTON ESTATES 263; Farrell v. Faries, 25 Del. Ch. 382, 22 A.2d 380
(1941); Loring v. Eliot, 82 Mass. (17 Gray) 568 (1860); Ware v. Rich-
ardson, 3 Md. 505 (1853). For varying statements of the rule, see 29
L.R.A. (N.S.) 973.
2. Slater v. Rudderforth, 25 App. D.C. 497 (1905); Security Trust Co.
v. Cooling, 28 Del. Ch. 303, 42 A.2d 784 (1945); Elsasser v. Elsasser, 159
Fla. 696, 32 So.2d 579 (1947); Harvey v. Ballard, 252 Ill. 57, 96 N.E.
558 (1911); Harlan v. Mannington, 152 Iowa 707, 133 N.E. 367 (1911);
Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md. 428, 144 Atl. 367 (1929); Peter v. Peter, 136
Md. 157, 110 Atl. 211 (1920); Steele v. Smith, 84 S.C. 464, 66 S.E. 200,
29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 939 (1909); Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S.C. 545 (1882);
Austin v. Payne, 8 Rich. Eq. 49 (S.C. 1855); Danner v. Trescott, 5 Rich.
Eq. 356 (S.C. 1852); Porter v. Doby, 2 Rich. Eq. 49 (S.C. 1845); RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY §312, comment h (1940); SIMES & SmITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS §1552 (1956).
3. Green v. Green, supra note 1; Shackelford v. Bullock, 34 Ala. 418
(1859) ; Elsasser v. Elsasser, supra note 2; Corwin v. Rheims, 390 Ill. 205,
61 NX.E.2d 40 (1945); Cowman v. Classen, supra note 2; Peter v. Peter,
supra note 2; Shugrue v. Long, 82 NJ.L. 717, 82 Atl. 905, 39 L.R.A.
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presents a departure from this requirement. For example,
suppose there is a grant to A in trust to manage, collect rents,
and pay income to B for life, and at death of B the property
is to go to B's heirs. B has an equitable life estate and the
heirs have a legal remainder; thus the rule will not apply.
A purely passive, naked, or dry trust, i.e., a trust with no
active duties imposed upon the trustee as to either the life
tenant or the remainderman, is subject to the operation of
the Statute of Uses and, the use being executed, both estates
are legal. Both estates are then of the same quality and the
Rule in Shelley's Case would apply, giving the life tenant a
legal fee, a result which seems to be clearly settled law. 4 An
example of such a trust is a grant to A, in trust for B for life,
remainder to the heirs of B. The Statute of Uses executes the
use in both the life tenant and the remainder, making both
legal. The rule then applies.
As already seen, if the estate of the ancestor and that of
the heirs are different in quality, the rule will not apply.
Thus in a trust such as "to A in trust to pay income to B for
life, remainder to B's heirs," the duty to pay income to the
life tenant is an active duty resulting in an equitable life es-
tate and a legal remainder. Accordingly the Rule in Shelley's
Case would have no application.5 Conversely, if the deed i~s
"to A in trust for B for life, then to convey to B's heirs," the
life estate is legal and, the duty to convey being an active duty,
the remainder is equitable and the rule has no application.5a
But if the trust were active as to both the life tenant and the
remainderman, such as a grant "to A in trust to pay income
to B for life, then to convey to the heirs of B," active duties
(N.S.) 257 (1912); Appeal of Van Syckel, 319 Pa. 347, 179 Atl. 721
(1935); Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R.I. 296 (1859); Youmans v. Youmans,
115 S.C. 186, 105 S.E. 31 (1920) ; Steele v. Smith, supra note 2; Gadsden
v. Desportes, 39 S.C. 131, 17 S.E. 706 (1893); Gourdin v. Deas, 27 S.C.
479, 4 S.E. 64 (1887) ; Austin v. Payne, supra note 2.
4. Burham v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 217 Md. 507, 144 A.2d 80
(1958) (semble); Burris v. Burris, 104 S.C. 441, 89 SE. 405 (1915);
Sligh v. Sligh, 92 S.C. 307, 83 S.E. 260 (1914); Boyles v. Wagner, 91
S.C. 183 74 S.E 380 (1911); Clark v. Neves, 76 S.C. 480, 57 S.E. 614, 12
L.R.A. (N.S.) 298 (1907); Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S.C. 545 (1882) (alter-
native holding); RESTATErIENT, PROPERTY §312, comment h (1940).
5. Green v. Green, suprm note 1; Shackelford v. Bullock, supra note 3;
Little v. Wilcox, 119 Pa. 439, 13 At]. 156 (1898); Thurston v. Thurston,
supra note 3; Gadsden v. Desportes, supra note 3; Carrigan v. Drake, 36
S.C. 354, 15 S.E. 339 (1892); Gourdin v. Deas, supra note 3; Austin v.
Payne, supra note 2.
5a. Steele v. Smith, supra note 2 (alternative holding).
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are in the trustee as to both estates, so they would both be
of an equitable quality and the rule would apply.6
Even so, there is a substantial body of law throughout the
various jurisdictions which excepts from the operation of the
rule a situation where both estates are of an equitable quality
or nature if the trust is considered to be executory. One case
states, however, that rather than there being a positive rule
* excepting an executory trust from the operation of the rule,
courts will merely attempt to except from the strict rule of
law those cases of executory trusts in which they can see from
the instrument itself that the rule would contravene the inten-
tion of the settlor.7 It would seem that this theory rests on
the principle that an executory trust is construed or enforced
by an equity court, which court, not being bound by the strict
rules of law, will attempt to ascertain and enforce the inten-
tion of the grantor, thereby excepting such a trust from the
rule.8
On the other hand, statements seemingly to the contrary
qare to be found, that in equity, equitable estates are construed
as legal estates and are subject to the same incidents, prop-
erties, and consequences that belong to similar estates at law.
6. Croxall v. Sherrerd, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 577, 18 L.Ed. 572 (1867);
Carpenter v. Hubbard, 263 Ill. 571, 105 N.E. 688 (1914); Newhall v.
Wheeler, 7 Mass. 189 (1928); Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67 (1881);
Starnes v. Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011, 22 L.R.A. 598 (1893); Neff v.
Abert 9 Ohio App. 286 (1918); Cowing v. Dodge, 19 R.I. 605, 35 Atl. 309
(1896); Angell's Petition, 13 MI. 630 (1882); Burnett v. Burnett, 17
S.C. 545 (1882) (alternative holding to active trust becoming passive);
Danner v. Trescott, 5 Rich. Eq. 356 (S.C. 1852) (use upon use situation,
,giving life tenant fee simple). But see Friedmeyer v. Lynch, 226 Iowa
251, 284 N.W. 160 (1939) (rule not applicable to trust situation) ; Hibler
v. Hibler, 208 Iowa 586, 226 N.W. 8 (1929) (rule applies only if no trust
Was created).
7. Angell's Petition, supra note 6. Compare Simns & SMITH, THE
FLAW op FuTuRn INTERESTS §1553 (2d ed. 1956) (to the effect that there
is no exception to the rule with respect to executory trusts).
8. Green v, Green, supra note 1; Sims v. Georgetown College, 1 App.
D.C. 72 (1893); Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 167 So. 669 (1936); Ed-
mrondson v. Dyson, 2 Ga. 307 (1847); Baker v. Scott, 62 Ill. 86 (1871);
Siceloff v. Redman's Adm'r., 26 Ind. 251 (1866); Berry v. Williamson,
50 Ky. R. 245 (1850); Loring v. Elliott, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 568 (1860)
(dictum); Henderson v. Henderson, 64 Md. 185, 1 Atl. 72 (1885) ; Cushing
v. Blake, 30 N.J. Eq. 689 (1879); Wood v. Burnham, 6 Paige 513 (N.Y.
1837); Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 R.I. 276 (1856); Steele v. Smith, supra
note 2; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 61 S.C. 243, 39 S.E. 391 (1901); Shaw v.
Robinson, 42 S.C. 354, 20 S.E. 161 (1894); Carrigan v. Drake, supra
note 5; Porter v. Doby, supra note 2 (citing Bagshaw v. Spencer, 1 Ves.
Sr. 142 (1748)).
[Vol. 15
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Thus, in giving effect to the limitations of trusts, courts of
equity adopt rules of law applicable to legal estates.9
Assuming that the intention of the grantor will govern in
cases of executory trusts, a recurrent problem is that of de-
fining such a trust. A variety of definitions are available, the
simplest test being whether the settlor of the trust has acted
as his own conveyancer, i.e., not merely stating his desires and
leaving the conveyancing to the trustee. If the grantor has
left the conveying to the trustee, it is considered to be an
executory trust.'0 Another test to determine if the trust is
executory is whether or not the creator of the trust expressed
his intention in general terms and the limitations of the trust
are imperfectly declared, leaving the manner in which the in-
tent is to be carried into effect substantially in the discretion
of the trustee." These two tests appear to be approximately
the same, the difference being in construction as to the im-
perfectly declared limitations. The latter rule, it seems, would
include the former. Some cases, apparently relying only on
the literal interpretation of the conveyancer test, say that a
duty or requirement on the trustee, or even a direction to him,
to make a future conveyance will result in an executory trust
construction. 12 Others, apparently relying on the required
general expression of intent coupled with imperfectly declared
limitations, say that something more than a mere direction
to convey or a required conveyance is necessary before a trust
will be considered executory. 3
South Carolina has taken the unique position that any active
trust is an executory trust. In the ancient case of Porter v.
9. Martling v. Martling, 55 N.J. Eq. 771, 39 AUt. 203, 204 (1898).
But cf. SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 7.
10. Wayne v. Lawrence, 58 Ga. 15 (1875) (dictum); Sutliff v. Aydelott,
373 Ill. 633, 27 N.E.2d 529 (1940); Berry v. Williamson, supra note 8;
Carradine v. Carradine, 33 Miss. 698 (1857); Tillinghast v. Coggeshall,
7 R.I. 883 (1863) (stating rule, but refusing to apply it).
11. Wiley v. Smith, 3 Kelley 551 (Ga. 1847); Carradine v. Carradine,
supra note 10; Martling v. Martling, supra note 9; Cushing v. Blake,
supra note 8; Williams v. Houston, 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 277 (1898);
Neff v. Abert, supra note 6.
12. Sutliff v. Aydelott, supra note 10 (requirement on trustee to con-
vey raises presumption of executory trust); Wayne v. Lawrence, supra
note 10 (direction to convey where all limitations complete makes trust
executory) ; Berry v. Williamson, supra note 8 (trust executory though
trustee has only to convey) ; Steele v. Smith, supra note 2.
13. Cushing v. Blake, 30 N.J. Eq. 689 (1879) (direction to convey; all
limitations declared; trust not executory); Neff v. Abert, supra note 6
(must be imperfectly declared limitation coupled with direction to con-
vey) ; Martling v. Martling, supra note 11; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall,
supra note 10.
4
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Doby,14 relying on the English case, Bagshaw v. Spencer,I
it was said that "the test of an executory trust is that the trus-
tee has some duty to perform, for the performance of which
it is necessary that the title be regarded as abiding in him."'1
It is here worth noting that while this was the rule in England
at one time, it was soon overruled.17 One possible analysis
would be that the court confused the terms "unexecuted trust,"
meaning a trust which is not executed by the Statute of Uses,
and "executory trust," meaning a trust which leaves sub-
stantial discretion in the trustee to accomplish the general in-
tention of the settlor.
At any rate, the test enunciated in Porter v. Doby was re-
affirmed in Carrigan v. Drake, Shaw v. Robinson, and Reyn-
olds ,v. Reynolds.'8 A subsequent case, Steele v. Smith,0 holds
that a duty to convey is such a duty as to prevent the operation
of the Statute of Uses and an active duty. The court then states
that "as the trust would be executory under the Statute of
Uses, we see no good reason for holding it not executory when
considering the application of the Rule in Shelley's Case."
20
The impact of this statement is to make any active trust exec-
utory and therefore without the operation of the Rule in
Shelley's Case. If this is correct, a very broad exception to
the rule is thus created.
The use of the word "executory" as applied to the
non-operation of the Statute of Uses is also worthy of notice.
The court, however, seemingly recognizes the generally ac-
cepted definition of an executory trust by quoting a treatise21
on the subject:
All trusts are executory in one sense of the word; that is,
the trustee must have some duty, either active or passive,
to perform, so that the Statute of Uses shall not execute
the estate in the cestui que tmust, and leave nothing in the
14. See note 2, upra.
15. See note 8, supra.
16. Porter v. Doby, 2 Rich. Eq. 49, 53 (S. C. 1845).
1'7. 1 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.46 (1952); SIMES & SMIT,
THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §1553 (2d ed. 1956).
18. Carrigan v. Drake, supra note 5; Shaw v. Robinson, supra note 8;
Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra note 8.
19. Steele v. Smith, 84 S.C. 464, 66 S.E. 200, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 939
(1909).
20. Id. at 471, 66 S.E. 200, 202.
21. PERRY, TRUSTS §359; see also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.46
(1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §312, comment h (1940); ScoM, TRUSTS
§127.2 (2d ed. 1956).
[Vol. 15
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trustee. But such is not the meaning of the judges when
they speak of executed trusts and executory trusts. These
words refer rather to the manner and perfection of their
creation than to the action of the trustee in administering
the property. Thus a trust created by a deed or will so
clear and certain in all its terms and limitations that a
trustee has nothing to do but to carry out all the pro-
visions of the instrument according to its letter is called
an executed trust. In these trusts technical words receive
their legal meaning, and the rule applicable to legal estates
governs the equitable estates thus created. On the other
hand, an executory trust is where an estate is conveyed
to a trustee upon trust, to be by him conveyed or settled
upon other trusts in certain contingencies, or upon certain
events, and these other trusts are imperfectly stated, or
mere outlines of them axe stated, to be afterwards drawn
out in a formal manner, and are to be carried into effect
according to the final form which the details and limi-
tations shall take under the direction thus given. They
are called executory, not because the trust is to be per-
formed in the future, but because the trust instrument
itself is to be molded into form and perfected according
to the outlines or instructions made or left by the settlor
or testator.
22
The court then declares the trust executory and without the
operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case, saying it falls within
this definition.23 Other South Carolina cases also seemingly
indicate that the rule will have no application to an active
trust, since such a trust is construed to be executory.24 Thus,
if in South Carolina, a deed is made to T in trust to pay
income to A for life, then to convey to A's heirs, the rule will
not apply although both estates are equitable, for this is said
to be an executory trust and without the operation of the Rule
in Shelley's Case. It should here be noted that the proposition
that the rule will apply when both estates are equitable is
still in effect in South Carolina where an active trust situation
is not present, thus the South Carolina cases applying the
Rule in Shelley's Case where both estates are equitable can
22. Note 19 supra at 470, 66 S.E. 200, 201.
23. The court also found the rule to be inapplicable because of the dif-
ference in the qualities of the estates.
24. Highland Park Mfg. Co., v. Steele, 232 Fed. 10 (4th Cir. 1916);
Youmans v. Youmans, 115 S.C. 186, 105 S.E. 31 (1920) ; Austin v. Payne,
8 Rich. Eq. 49 (S.C. 1855).
1963]
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be reconciled with the cases just cited. For example, in
Danner v. Trescott,2 4 a a limitation to A, to the use of A, in
trust for B for life, then in trust to and for B's heirs was
held to constitute a fee in B, this being a use upon a use
resulting in both estates being equitable. South Carolina is
said to be unique in this doctrine of an active trust being
executory; in fact one authority states that South Carolina
is the only jurisdiction reaching this conclusion today.25
This same authority states also that, regardless of cases
to the contrary, there is no exception to the Rule in Shelley's
Case with respect to executory trusts.26 It would seem, how-
ever, from the cases herein cited, that there is a substantial
body of law excepting such trusts from the rule, the primary
difficulty being the varying definitions of an executory trust.
While the South Carolina definition is contrary to the settled
general definition of an executory trust, it appears that the
doctrine has merit. The Rule in Shelley's Case has long been
held to be a rule of law which operates contrary to the inten-
tion of the creator, settlor, or testator. The reason and
rationale of the rule have long been extinct, but its applica-
tion has persisted under the doctrine of stare decisis. Virtually
all jurisdictions, including South Carolina, have now recog-
nized this and abolished the rule by statute.26a However, any
instrument created prior to the enactment of the statute is to
be construed under the common law. By its definition of an
executory trust, South Carolina has created a broad exception
to the rule, thus giving greater weight to the purpose and
intent of the draftsman of the instrument and achieving a
result more nearly that intended by the settlor of the trust.
As a result, fewer cases in South Carolina reach a result which
is obviously contrary to that intended by the settlor.
24a. 5 Rich. Eq. 356 (S.C. 1852).
25. SIMES & SmITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §1553 (2d ed.
1956).
26. Ibid.
26a. S.C. CODE §57-2 (1952).
"The rule of law lmown as the Rule in Shelley's Case is hereby abolished
in the following particulars, to wit: When, by deed or will or by any in-
strument in writing, a remainder in lands, tenements, hereditaments or
other real estate shall be limited to the heirs, or heirs of the body, of a
person to whom a life estate in the same premises is given, the persons
who, on the termination of the life estate, are the heirs or heirs of the
body of such tenant for life shall take as purchasers in fee simple, by
virtue of the remainder so limited to them. The provisions of this section
shall not affect wills, deeds and other instruments in writing executed
prior to October 1, 1924, or the construction of such wills, deeds and other
instruments in writing."
[Vol. 15
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A further problem arises in that a trust may be active
when established, yet become passive due to the occurrence
of some subsequent event. For example, prior to the removal
of the disability of married women, A transfers to T, trustee,
imposing active duties on the trustee to preserve the separate
estate of W for her life, then to W's heirs. H, husband of W,
dies during W's lifetime. At the outset, it is clear that W has
an equitable life estate and there being a legal remainder, the
Rule in Shelley's Case will have no application. But after
the occurrence of a subsequent event (here the death of H),
the active duties terminate and the estates become of like
quality. Would the Rule in Shelley's Case then apply?
It seems well settled that the extinguishing of the active
duties imposed on the trustee will call the Statute of Uses
into play, causing the use to be executed in the beneficiary,
and thereby changing his heretofore equitable estate into a
legal one.27 From that point the cases are in substantial con-
flict as to whether the Rule in Shelley's Case can then apply
if it were inapplicable when the trust was created.
Pennsylvania has met the problem squarely in holding that
events subsequent to the creation of the instrument, causing
the estates of the life tenant and the remainderman to become
of the same quality, will call the rule into play and the estate
will be enlarged into a fee.2 8 No other jurisdiction is so clear
on this issue.
At least one Maryland case, by way of dictum, indicates
that upon the termination of an active trust, the estates be-
come of the same quality and the rule would become op-
27. Jennings v. Kotz, 299 Ill. 465, 132 N.E. 625 (1921); Moore v.
Stinson, 144 Mass. 594, 12 N.E. 410 (1887); Glasgow v. Missouri Car &
Foundry Co., 229 Mo. 585, 129 S.W. 900 (1910); Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C.
717, 88 S.E. 889, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 514 (1916); Cameron v. Hicks, 141
N.C. 21, 53 S.E. 728, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 407 (1906); Zelley v. Zelley, 101
N.J. Eq. 37, 136 Atl. 738 (1927); Milton v. Pace, 85 S.C. 373, 67 S.E.
458 (1910); Kennedy v. Colclough, 67 S.C. 121, 45 S.E. 139 (1903); Shaw
v. Robinson, 42 S.C. 347, 20 S.E. 161 (1894); Davis v. Townsend, 32 S.C.
115, 10 S.E. 837 (1890); Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S.C. 545 (1882); Austin
v. Payne, 8 Rich. Eq. 9 (1855); Temple v. Ferguson, 110 Tenn. 84, 100
Am. St. Rep. 791, 72 S.W. 455 (1903). Contra, Nave v. Bailey, 329 Ill.
234, 160 N.E. 605 (1928) (stating that statute executes use, if at all,
only when use is created) ;Lord v. Comstock, 240 lI. 492, 88 N.E. 1012
(1909), affirming McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N.E. 139 (1908)
(trust once active remains so for purposes of Statute of Uses).
28. Wilson v. Heilman, 219 Pa. 237, 68 Atl. 674 (1908); Shalters v.
Ladd, 141 Pa. 349, 21 Atl. 596 (1891) (dictum); Carson v. Fuhs, 131
Pa. 256, 18 AtI. 1017 (1890); William's Appeal, 83 Pa. 377 (1877);
Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa 492 100 Am. Dec. 586 (1869) (semble); Nice's
Appeal, 50 Pa. 143 (18655; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 (1859);
Steacy v. Rice, 27 Pa. 75, 67 Am. Dec. 447 (1856).
1963]
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eratable.20 There is some indication that the same rule
would apply in North Carolina.30
As to South Carolina, the question seems not to have been
squarely presented. There are inferences, some strong, some
weak, to the effect that subsequent events will call the Rule
in Shelley's Case into existence when it did not exist origi-
nally."' However the problem in these cases was disposed of
on other grounds without meeting this issue.
There are other cases posed by the provisions of the 1868
South Carolina Constitution removing the disabilities of mar-
ried women and eliminating the need for the interposition of
a trust to protect the separate estate. Before the constitutional
provision, trusts were established such as "to A in trust for
the sole use of W [a married woman] for her life," imposing
active duties on the trustee, "remainder to W's heirs." The
disappearance of the need caused the active duties to terminate
and the Statute of Uses to operate, and the theretofore
equitable estate of the wife became legal. The problem of the
application of the Rule in Shelley's Case was there more
directly met, and the position seems to be taken that the
quantum or incident of the estate originally granted cannot be
changed by that subsequent event.32 Similarly the court, in
First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Deschamps,33 said:
Even if the trust in this deed was executed upon the death
of the life tenant, that does not affect its construction
as a trust deed. Such a deed takes effect when it is made,
and the construction that would be given it at that time
holds true throughout the life of the instrument. The
court might have been called upon for the construction
of this deed before the death of the life tenant and before
the trust became executed. Can it be contended that the
construction now asked to be put upon the deed should be
different from the construction that would have been put
on it if it had come before the court prior to the death
29. Burnham v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 217 Md. 507, 144 A.2d
80 (1958).
30. Starnes v. Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011, 22 L.R.A. 598 (1893)
(dictum involving contingent remainder).
31. Youmans v. Youmans, supra note 24; Sligh v. Sligh, 99 S.C. 307,
83 S.E. 260 (1914); Kennedy v. Colclough, supra note 27; Reynolds v.
Reynolds, supra note 8; Shaw v. Robinson, supra note 27; Porter v. Doby,
9upra note 14.
32. Milton v. Pace, supra note 27; Gadsden v. Desportes, 39 S.C. 131,
17 S.E. 706 (1893); Withers v. Jenkins, 14 S.C. 598 (1880).
33. 171 S.C. 466, 172 S.E. 622, (1934).
808 [Vol. 15
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of the life tenant? The deed cannot be construed as
meaning one thing one day and something else the next.8 4
In this connection also, there are to be found statements to
the effect that when the Statute of Uses converts an equitable
estate into a legal one, the same conditions, limitations, and
qualities attach to the latter as were possessed by the former.3,
These statements were made regarding trusts which were
passive or dry at the outset, but the general application is
readily apparent.
Some authorities take the position that if the requirements
of the rule are met after the instrument takes effect, the rule
would apply, provided they are met "by virtue of the pro-
visions in the creating instrument which contemplate the later
change."3 6 The rationale of this latter requirement is that
were it otherwise, the estates would not have been created in
the same instrument and the rule could not apply.
On the other hand, a vigorous dissent to the proposition
of subsequent events calling the rule into play is expressed by
another authority, whose contention is that if the rule was in-
applicable to the conveyance when the instrument took effect,
it could not thereafter become operative:37
The Rule in Shelley's Case is absurd enough as usually
applied; but to extend it so as to transform a contingent
remainder in the heirs into a vested remainder in the
ancestor years after the original conveyance and just
because the ancestor's equitable life estate became a
legal one is even more ridiculous.88
There seems to be considerable merit in this position, for
otherwise what had been only a life estate in the ancestor is
uddenly enlarged into a fee upon the operation of the rule
after some supervening event which allows the Statute of
Uses to operate. It would be more consistent with the normal
intention of the testator to refuse to apply the rule if it were
inapplicable to the instrument when it became effective.
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34. Id. at 479-480, 172 S.E. 622, 627.
35. Young v. McNeil, 78 S.C. 143, 59 S.E. 986 (1907); Willinon v.
'Holmes, 4 Rich. Eq. 475 (S.C. 1850).
36. 47 AM. JuR., Rule in Shelley's Case §§26, 29; 1 AMIMcA LAW
F PROPERTY §4.49 (1952); 3 PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY §379 (1952);
PRESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §312, comment q (1940).
37. SIMES & SMITH, THE LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS §1562 (2d ed.
1956).
38. Ibid.
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